Abstract-A fundamental result in information-theoretic faulttolerant distributed computing is that unconditionally secure broadcast (or Byzantine agreement) among three players is impossible if one player is misbehaving. In particular, imperfect broadcast with failure probability ε is achievable if and only if
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing is to achieve consistency of the involved parties' views, even if some of the parties (also called players) deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. A core primitive for achieving global consistency is broadcast, i.e., a mechanism or protocol allowing one player, the sender, to send a value consistently to all other players such that, even in case of malicious behavior by the sender and/or some of the other players, all honest players receive the same value. The seminal result of Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [LSP82] is that broadcast can be implemented if and only if less than a third of all the players misbehave.
A. Model
We assume a set P of n players that are connected via a complete synchronous network of pairwise authenticated channels, i.e., channels that guarantee the authenticity of the sender. Whether the channels additionally guarantee privacy against a potential eavesdropper does not matter for our results. Synchronicity means that all players share common, synchronized clock cycles and that messages being sent during a clock cycle are guaranteed to have arrived at the beginning of the next cycle.
The resilience of a protocol is characterized by the number t of players that may deviate from the protocol. We refer to such a player as being corrupted whereas a non-corrupted player is called correct. It helps to imagine a central adversary who can corrupt up to t players and make them cheat in an arbitrary, coordinated manner.
In this paper, we make the distinction between a rushing and a non-rushing adversary. The natural assumption is that the adversary is rushing. A rushing adversary is given the power, during each communication cycle, to first collect all messages addressed to corrupted players -and exploit this information in order to decide on what the corrupted players send during the same cycle. In [GY89] , this model is called the sequential model.
A less natural assumption is a non-rushing adversary. A non-rushing adversary cannot base the messages to be sent during a particular cycle on the messages the corrupted players receive during the same cycle. In [GY89] , this model is called the simultaneous model.
B. Broadcast Definition 1 (ε-BC):
A protocol among n players P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } where player p s (the sender) holds an input value x s ∈ D (from a finite domain D) and every player p i finally decides on an output value y i ∈ D achieves ε-broadcast (ε-BC) if it satisfies the following conditions with probability at least 1 − ε:
• CONSISTENCY: All correct players p i compute the same output, y i = y.
• VALIDITY: If p s is correct then every correct p i computes y i = x s . Typically, broadcast protocols are required to involve a negligible error probability ε > 0 or even required to be perfect (ε = 0). For this case, it was shown that broadcast is achievable if and only if t < n/3 [LSP82] . In particular, this implies that broadcast among three players with negligible error probability is impossible. The minimal error probability that is still achievable in this case was given in [KY84] (simultaneous model) and [GY89] (sequential model).
Proposition 1: [KY84] In the simultaneous model, ε-BC among three players is achievable if and only if ε ≥ 1/3.
Proposition 2: [GY89] In the sequential model, ε-BC among three players is achievable if and only if ε ≥ (3 − √ 5)/2 ≈ 0.38.
C. Contribution
In this paper, we demonstrate the somewhat counterintuitive fact that µ-BC with sufficiently small µ can be amplified to ε-BC with arbitrarily small error probability ε > 0. In particular, we show that this is possible if and only if µ < 1/3. For the general case of n players and any number of corrupted players, we finally show that µ-BC with µ < 1/n allows for ε-BC with arbitrarily small ε.
II. RESULTS
Lemma 1: In the sequential (or even simultaneous) model, among three players, µ-BC with µ ≥ 1/3 cannot be amplified to ε-BC with ε < 1/3.
Proof: The lemma directly follows from Proposition 1.
In order to prove the achievability part, we use the result in [FM00] that weak broadcast (or crusader agreement) [Dol82] is sufficient to achieve broadcast among three players.
Definition 2 (ε-WBC):
A protocol where the sender holds input x s ∈ D and every player p i finally decides on y i ∈ D ∪ {⊥} achieves ε-weak-broadcast (ε-WBC) if it satisfies the following conditions with probability at least 1 − ε:
• CONSISTENCY: If any correct player p i computes y i = ⊥ then every correct player p j computes y j ∈ {y i , ⊥}.
• VALIDITY: If p s is correct then every correct p i computes y i = x s . Theorem 1: In the sequential model, among three players, µ-BC with µ < 1/3 allows for ε-BC with arbitrarily small ε > 0. In particular, this can be achieved from O(k · δ −2 ) invocations of µ-BC where k is the security parameter (ε < 2 −k ) and δ = 1/3 − µ.
Proof: In [FM00] , it was shown that one invocation of weak broadcast among three players can be turned into broadcast without introducing any additional error probability. It is thus sufficient to show how to achieve ε-WBC.
The sender sends his input message x s ∈ {0, 1} m times (for large enough m) using µ-BC. Each recipient R i decides on y i = b if he received bit b ∈ {0, 1} at least 2m/3 times, and on y i = ⊥, otherwise.
Let X i (i = 1, . . . , m) be the m independent binary random variables such that X i = 1 exactly if the i-th invocation of µ-BC failed; and let δ = 1/3 − µ.
If the sender is correct then the probability that the protocol fails can be estimated by Chernoff Bound
If the sender is corrupted then, in order to make the protocol fail, he must achieve that both recipients disagree on the outcome of at least m/3 invocations of µ-BC. Thus, the probability that the protocol fails with a corrupted sender can be estimated by the same Chernoff bound as above.
Choosing m ≥ 3µ ln(ε −1 ) δ 2 = O(kδ −2 ) thus guarantees an error probability of at most Prob err ≤ ε.
More generally than in the three-player case, it can be shown that, among any number n of players, µ-BC for sufficiently small µ allows for ε-BC with arbitrarily small ε.
Theorem 2: In the sequential model, among n players where any number of players can be corrupted, µ-BC with µ < 1/n allows for ε-BC with arbitrarily small ε > 0. In particular, this can be achieved from O(n 2 k · δ −2 ) invocations of µ-BC where k is the security parameter (ε < 2 −k ) and δ = 1/n − µ.
Proof: In [CFF + 05] it was shown that, among n players, n-proxcast (a generalization of weak broadcast with multiple intermediary values ⊥) is sufficient in order to achieve broadcast. Furthermore, n-proxcast can be achieved from µ-BC (µ < 1/n) in a similar way as, among three players, weak broadcast from µ-BC (µ < 1/3). The theorem now follows from the analysis in [CFF + 05].
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